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Introduction
The Japanese financial market has been significantly shaken up by the burst of asset price bubble in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a direct consequence, the banking sector has undergone a forced consolidation process which had been reflected by a large number of bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions and consequently stronger competition within the banking sector. This paper investigates how the consolidation process has affected the degree of competition within the segment of Credit Associations (CA) and Credit Cooperatives (CC) in Japan. These financial institutions play a significant role within the financial mark and their share in terms of deposits and loans is 20 percent and 25 percent respectively. The methodological concept of this study is based on non-structural models H statistics (Panzar and Rosse (1987) ). This methodology is considered as a standard method to estimate a degree of competition across the industry. They concluded that that the efficient hypothesis is supported in the case of organizational efficiency measure and the efficient hypothesis is not accepted in the case of scale diseconomy measure. Molyneux et al. (1996) tested contestability conditions in the Japanese banking sector for City banks and Regional banks. They considered that the existing banks in Japanese banking market tend to interfere with the new entry from the outside, and it should affect to the price setting. In fact, they measured the H statistics (Panzar-Rosse test) with the revenue function using two years' cross-section data (1986 and 1988) .
Their results showed that the banking market in 1986 was in monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions, and, in 1988, it changed into the monopolistic competition.
They concluded, therefore, that it was caused by the contestable behaviour of the existing banks that there are only a small number of de novo banks in Japanese domestic lending market. However, they also represented another conclusion that the competitive price would be realized through increased competition in the future. Niimi (1998) analyzed the H-statistics to examine the relationship between the City banks and their customer companies in Japan during 1980 and 1990. Two interesting results were found that oligopolistic condition during the bubble boom of the 1980s and the market in the 1990s was in the monopolistic competition. That is, the degree of competition had increased.
This strand of research motivates and guides our empirical research about the competition conditions in the segment of CA and CC. There are two main motivations for our research. Firstly, there is limited empirical research tackling the market structure of the Japanese mutual financial institutions. Secondly, we compare structural and non structural models that could reinforce our results and consequently policy recommendation.
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides an overview about the role and place of Credit Associations and Credit Cooperatives within the Japanese banking sector. The following Section reviews the recent empirical literature. Section 4 describes applied models. Section 5 discusses empirical results and Final Section concludes. Table 1 shows the relative size of private financial institutions in Japan. It may be of interest to show that total loans and total deposits of CA are much larger than not only those of Second regional banks but also Trust banks. In particular, total deposits of CA are nearly 30% of City banks and 42.8% of Regional banks. However, the total volume asset of CA is much smaller than all kind of commercial banks. In contrast, all data of CC are much smaller than those of CA. These facts mean that CA have a very important place, but CC play a much smaller role in financial industry of Japan. Table 2 indicates the change of institutions and employees over the analysed period. Over eight years number of institutions was reduced by 25% and the number of employees was also correspondingly reduced. However, the membership over the same period increased by 7%. Table 3 provides the same information about Credit Cooperatives. We see that the decline was even more dramatic comparing Credit Association. The number of Cooperatives declined by more than 50% and the number of employees was cut by more than 40%. Unlike Credit Association the membership has been reduced by 16%. 5 In fact, the amount of corporate tax for ordinary corporation such as commercial banks is '… the 34.5% of total amount of income in each year' (Article 66), while that for the cooperative unions such as Credit associations and Credit unions is '… the 25%' (Article 66.2.). 6 The new capital adequacy requirements to the cooperative financial institutions will be started at March, 2007, as well as the case of ordinary banks. In the risk assessment for the calculation of capital adequacy ratio, not only credit risk and market risk but also operational risk will be included.
The role and place of Credit Association and Credit Cooperatives

Data and Methodology
The sample includes about 300 Credit Associations and 200 Credit Cooperatives over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Data are collected from the annual reports.
Market concentration measures
As banking industry deals with multiple products, it is difficult to define all structures from the simple market range. And there is not adequate measurement reflecting the degree of monopoly as market structure. Heggestad (1979) indicates that there are three problems with measuring the concentration of the banking market.
Firstly, to find the appropriate general index for the concentration, secondly, to select the relevant economic variables for measuring the difference of bank size, and finally to explain the difference of competition of inter-institutions, between banks and non-banks.
Research studies apply two kinds of concentration index. First, the k-bank concentration ratio as the k-bank concentration index is used most frequently in empirical studies. The following equation is employed to aggregate the market share of the k-large banks in the market;
where CR k is the k-bank concentration index; S i is the market share of bank i.
Although this index emphasises on the k leading banks, the remaining banks in the market are neglected. There are no rules for the determination of the number of banks.
Therefore, the number of banks included in the concentration index could be determined at discretion. The concentration index is considered as one point on the concentration curve, and is the first-order measure ranging between zero and one. In the case that there are an infinitely large number of banks having equivalent sizes (that is, if the k-bank value is relatively small to the number of total banks), its index approaches to zero. And on the contrary, the figure would be near unity if the number of the whole industry is incorporated in the calculation for the concentration estimation. If the n-banks having same size dominate banking industry,
. This formula is a decreasing function to the number of banks in the market, and it is equal to n e =k/CR k .
Next indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI). This is the most common measure as the concentration index in the theoretical literature. And it is often used as the benchmark to estimate the other concentration measures against because the HHI includes the impacts from total banks. The function form for the HHI is:
It represents as the sum of squared market share. The HHI expresses the importance of large banks by assigning the large weight. And by including each bank individually, the problems such as the arbitrary cut-off and the insensitivity to the share distribution are avoided. The HHI index is ranged between 1/n and 1. If all banks have same size in the market, the HHI would approach to the minimum value, which is the reciprocal of the number of banks. On the contrary, the index would be unity in the case of monopoly. As the HHI reacts well to the number of firms and the variance, it is shown as the decent index. However, as these measures are mutually related, the selection of market structure does not have any critical importance for the test of the SCP hypothesis. (Heggestad (1979)) In general, the structure of concentration index becomes either discrete or cumulative. The discrete measure of concentration corresponds to the arbitrary point on the concentration curve. For instance, the k-bank concentration belongs in the group of this individual measure. The advantage of an individual measure is that the required data is simple and definite. There were supporters as well as opponents, in the previous literature. However, both researches discuss about the impact of concentration to the banking market structure. The most of supporters have a viewpoint that the market behaviour, which is dominated by a small number of banks, would not influence in the total number of banks in the market. In other words, the concentration index based on the total number of banks does not necessarily represent large size, and it could just change the ultimate conclusion limitedly. In contrast, the opponents show the viewpoint that every bank in the market has some effect to the market direction and there is severe inadequacy in the individual index. That is, it is asserted that some structural changes in the industry, not including in the index, are unfortunately ignored in those individual indices. Even the competitive behaviour by small sized market players might have significant market power as well as large player.
Non structural model -H statistics
In this section, non-structural measure on the market competition is discussed with In the measurement of H statistics, it is required as assumption or condition that the market attains the long-term equilibrium. The empirical test is considered from the following story. At the competitive capital market in the equilibrium, the risk-adjusted return is uniformized between banks. Thus it is considered that the input prices should not be correlated statistically with the rate of return. In contrast, if the market is not in the equilibrium, the increase (decrease) of input price makes the rate of return drop (rise) temporally. The change of input price would be correlated with the rate of return significantly. Therefore, it may be tested if the market is in a long equilibrium by replacing the bank revenues by return on asset (ROA) and calculating the E statistics in the equation. 7 In other words, if the E statistics is smaller than 0 (E stat < 0), it means the market is in disequilibrium. And if it is equal to 0 (E stat = 0) statistically, it represents the market equilibrium. (Shaffer (1982) , Molyneux et al. (1994 Molyneux et al. ( , 1996 , Classens and Laeven (2004) , Matthews et al. (2006)) With regards to the H statistics of the Panzar and Rosse approach, the model is specified as follows (Panzar and Rosse (1987) , Nathan and Neave (1989) , and DeBandt and Davis (2000)): lnR = α 0 + α 1 lnPL+ α 2 lnPK + α 3 lnPF +α 4 lnS + α 5 lnX +ε where R is the revenue of banks, PL is the input price of labour, PK is the input price of capital, and PF is the input price of financial fund. These three input prices are used as endogenous variables, and the sum of the coefficients of these three variables are defined as the H statistics. In fact, PL employs the ratio of the personnel costs to the member of employees as the proxy. The ratio of nonpersonnal expenses to the total cost of personal property and fixed property could become a proxy of PK. And the cost of raising funds to total costs (including deposits, the CD, debt loan, and credit) would be a proxy of PF. Bank-Specific Factors are additional explanatory variables, and reflect the gap such as risk, cost, size, and bank structure. Ratio of risk capital fund to asset, ratio of loans to total asset, or ratio of the nonperforming loans to total loans are considered as a risk factor. Although there are some other variables which refer to bank-properties, total asset is often accepted as the size factor of banks.
We also include the exogenous variables into our equation; market size (S) and further characteristics (X) that should capture the behaviour of CC and CA. The determinants of X are considered the difference of risks, deposit mix, and organizational structures. In this study, the risk factor uses the ratio of loan loss reserves in total gross loans, and the deposit-mix factor employs total deposits to total assets.
From the above developments, the model of the H-statistics by the Panzar and
Rosse approach on the Japanese cooperative financial institutions is derived as following revenue functions: 
[Equation for E statistics (Long-term equilibrium)]
In addition, the estimated equation for the market equilibrium is defined as follows. Here, the new explained variable,  , refers to the return on assets (ROA). The E statistics is calculated as Table 4 and 5 show the empirical results of Rosse-Panzar 's H-statistics and long term equilibrium test (E stat) for Japanese Credit associations and Credit cooperatives, respectively. The H statistics is represented in the third section from the bottom in Table 4 . Although the value of H-stat is 0.64 in the no fixed effect, it remarkably decrease to 0.575 in 1-way fixed effect model and 0.51 in 2-way model. These three values all are significantly different from H=0 and H=1 in 1% level, respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that Credit associations and Credit cooperatives are in the monopolistic competitive market.
Empirical Results
As for the other control variables, it is found that the logarithmic asset (lnAST) is positively related to total revenue (lnREV). It suggests that the scale merit acts to the cooperative financial institutions significantly. As the ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loan (LLR/GRSLOAN) is used as the figure for risky behaviour, we expected it will have a negative relationship with total revenue. However, the result showed positive relationship with revenue. The ratio of total deposit to total asset is employed as the measure of bank performance. As the increase of its figure means the growth of the expenses in total balance, it is expected to be negative number. The result followed our expectation.
Our estimate shows that H statistics is significant and positive with values from 0.51 to 0.63 depending on an estimation technique. However, if the market is not in the equilibrium, it is difficult to use the value of H statistics as the measure of market competition. Thus, in Table 5 , the result of equilibrium test by Shaffer is represented.
The E statistics are indicated in the third bottom section on the table. The E-statistics on no-fixed effect is 0.07 and it could not reject the null hypothesis, E=0, in which the market attain the long term equilibrium. In contrast, the E statistics of 1-way and 2-way model are -0.266 and -0.300, respectively. These two results significantly reject the hypothesis, E=0, in 1% level. Therefore, as a result, it is difficult to conclude that the result of H statistics in Table 4 is available. In other words, from these estimations, it was not found the fact that Japanese Credit associations and Credit cooperatives are in the monopolistic competitive market.
Conclusions
This study analyses competition conditions of Mutual Financial Institutions in Japan.
We apply a traditional non-structural methods introduced by Panzar and Rosse (1987) .
The analysed sample is a representative sample of Credit Associations and Credit Cooperatives operating in Japan.
By applying our restricted model we find that Credit Association and Credit Cooperatives operate in monopolistic markets. The results correspond to research findings by Molyneux et al. (1996) , Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005) , and Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) .
Our estimate indicates that size of mutual financial institution has a positive impact on revenue. The same may be seen for the number of branches. In fact, it means that the growth of banks activities is reflected in higher revenues. On the other hand, the coefficient of the applied ratio (Deposits/Assets) has a negative sign and is statistically significant that corresponds with the notion that the increase in deposit means reduction of interest revenue for banks. However, a further research is needed in order to confirm our results. 2750 2750 2750 Note: (i) each figure below the coefficients is t-value., (ii) *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
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